Consociationalism and the Institution of Social Democracy in the EU

The term welfare state has become increasingly controversial among populations who like to fabricate it with their own definition. It predominantly describes institutions associated with the production and distribution of social well-being. The definition of “social well-being” clearly varies according to each country’s standards, and it is evident when looking at contrasting models of individual welfare states. These systems can differ greatly in scope and size, with some models contributing to growth at the lowest common denominations, and others subsidizing and socializing costs at the highest marginal rates. Some assume responsibility only when the individual family or aspects of the market fail, while some comprehensively address the needs of the entire population in a perpetual manner (Esping & Anderson, 1991). Rather than existing as a mechanism that intervenes in or corrects structures of inequality, the type of social policy enacted creates a system of stratification which is in itself an active force in the ordering of social relations. As globalization and markets become increasingly hegemonic, universalistic forces, the welfare of the individual comes to depend on monetary exchange, eventually culminating in value reduction of a person below a certain threshold of dollars.

Concepts of social democracy have existed in Europe for generations. The ideas supported by these schools of thought dealt with the issue of overcoming constraining boundaries placed on citizens by market forces. The stripping of layers which serve to protect people and guarantee social reproduction commodifies their existence as their livelihood comes to rely on labor competition (Esping & Anderson). The introduction of social rights reduces this commodity status, as reliance on the market is reduced and greater autonomy results. Residual welfare states seek to limit benefits to marginal groups deemed to be deserving of resources. Institutional welfare states tend to the needs of entire populations, and principally, what makes this system different is that it sees conscience, and not class, as key to political power (Cramme & Diamond, 2012). They extend commitment to all areas of distribution for the greater well being of society. With an enduring framework of ethical values combined with a strong commitment to evolving normative ideals, the eradication of human misery and suffering is the main priority.  Since the end of World War II, there has been striking variation in policy pursued by center left parties, and each has sought to evolve their own particular model of welfare, with varying degrees of success from each (Esping & Anderson). Many western European countries were dominated by the Christian Democratic Right, promising a new model of social market capitalism, but it was only in Scandinavia where the center-left sustained electoral hegemony and the institutional model of welfare. With regard to collective provisions, it is claimed that member states of the EU have lost control over national welfare policies, and social policy is becoming ever more situated in a complex, multi-layered web of political decision making (McEwen & Moreno, 2005). One mechanism which may serve as a good example of this reduced autonomy is illustrated by European Commission activity surrounding external trade policy.

The EC trade negotiations are conducted between EU member states, the commission, and trade partners. Individual states form their own negotiating positions which serve to reflect their own domestic interests. These positions are then deliberated further by the states collectively in order to determine an official mandate for the Commission to work for in wider trade talks. The commission then negotiates in the wider talks within the constrained frame constructed by the interests of the individual states. In the class text, contributor Meunier (2007) noted that neither the adoption of the approach of “managed globalization” or “Global Europe” involved a new mandate from member states. The writer then noted that there was little evidence to uphold the argument that the commission had significant autonomy in creating policy. I disagree on the grounds that concessions had to be met from each country regardless. There was definite presence of constraining attitudes surrounding the trade talks, otherwise every state could have adequately represented themselves rather than delegate a body to form a collective, majoritarian interest to eliminate marginalized concerns in the process. While productive in terms of completing the objective of formalizing an agreement, the move to allow the EC to negotiate deals for the states effectively stripped them of some power, ultimately undermining consociationalism.

 It is hardly surprising that various models of social democracy have not proven to be as successful as others. At the core of the issue is whether shifts in policy inevitably entail the dilution of core values of the country. Because globalization and the free flow of capital limits the potential for traditional social democratic intervention in a unitary economy, the value of those phenomena must be evaluated. The downgrading of government activism in the face of global market competition has left those in the middle and lower income brackets relatively unprotected. Structural unemployment and worklessness have increased while wealth and income inequality has soared, with those at the very top reaping increasingly greater benefits (Cramme & Diamond). Social democracy has become more and more defensive in facing these challenges, which fuel cynicism and disengagement from politics itself. Recognizing the limits of the European Union as a form of economic and political coordination is imperative for social democrats. The drive toward further economic integration since the 1950s has hardly protected member states from the impacts of globalization and the restructuring of industry (Cramme & Diamond). The realities of national politics appear to be far removed from EU activity as the gap between institutions and citizens continues to flourish without the advent of a strong political anchor. In the aftermath of the recent financial meltdown and Greek sovereign debt crisis, the EU appears to offer little reassurance to economic despair.

It has been of great controversy that a divide of interests has set apart the beneficiaries of the developing globalized economic sectors against low-skilled workers whose wages have continued to decline. This social divide is markedly important due to the political implications it presents, effectively marginalizing groups due to their falling wages and stagnant social mobility. In addition to this, Europe also faces issues dealing with the reception of immigrants, who have been marked as “others” in some realms of society (McEwen & Moreno). The response by social democrats to the problems of integration and social malaise have clearly been shown to be insufficient, and as a result, some of its past historic achievements are under threat from opposing factions. The European Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy is measured in terms of social, economic, and political participation. The aspect of participation is in itself likely the most important, whereby one obtains an adequate level of education and employability to flourish in society (Cramme & Diamond). A group of people cannot be considered successfully integrated when their school performance, labor market participation, average life expectancy, and imprisonment rate disproportionately deviate from the averages of the population. In most European societies, immigrant groups and their second and third generation descendents are often entrenched by these problems. As complex as the process of integration proves to be, incorporating newcomers into society can be achieved, and the institutions of education and labor seem to be the most effective means of doing so (Cramme & Diamond). Lamentably, states do not always put forth effort to extend these benefits to migrants. Inclusiveness proves to be the difference maker in whether or not a person may have the opportunity to delve into a new society. Barriers to entering the labor market and unequal access to education limit the ability of some folks to adequately handle the immersion experience, and new forms of vulnerability and resentment emerge as political parties exploit the feelings of vulnerability and xenophobia demonstrated by populations who feel threatened by the presence of new ethnic groups (McEwen & Moreno). This is especially prevalent in countries with proportional representation and fragmented political landscapes. A dangerous vacuum has emerged whereby “cultural” explanations are employed to stoke up social tensions between the immigrant population and the native population (Cramme & Diamond).

Failed integration serves to create an association between being non-native, being poor, and being welfare dependent. This tempts members of the native population “in-groups” to define failed integration, deprivation, and inequality not as socioeconomic issues, but as issues brought about by the migrant cultures themselves. These “cultural explanations” serve only as fuel for mutual estrangement, heightening socioeconomic marginalization, and poor integration of immigrant communities (McEwen & Moreno). The Netherlands, for example, plays host to many Moroccans and Turks who do not really identify with their new country, but rather consider themselves foreigners in their new land, which could lead to an array of pathologies resulting from a lack of a sense of community. Continuing developments have led to a broadening of the meaning of integration to include the extent to which non-natives share values as well as the lifestyle of their new countries. Integration done the right way will leave out the confusion purported by right wing populism, which seeks to continually objectify immigrants as dumb, dangerous, welfare dependent foreigners who may be a threat to society.

Challenges such as these call into question one of the central functions that have evolved within the responsibility of the state - the protection of citizens welfare. In surveying history, it would not be inaccurate to claim that it has been the responsibility of the state to grant social rights and provide social support for its members. This is in conflict with ideas professing that the use of societal resources is grounded in national identity. The emotional force of nationhood and feelings of acceptance it brings about contributes to the collectivity of social risk and the democratization of weighty negative outcomes. States that could impose obligations to solidarity and create a union of the strong and weak actors were able to form collective schemes of provision to develop healthy societies. These types of welfare transactions serve as expressions of the concept of society backed by a sense of community and strengthened by the legitimacy of the state and its institutions. This portrayal of the state as the protector and possessor of solidarity has led many to the conclusion that only states can develop comprehensive welfare programs (McEwen & Moreno). The capacity for substantial supranational political intervention in Europe is negligible, and even further restricted by a lack of motivational resources that could give legitimacy to interventionist strategies. Based on these notions, it has been suggested that establishing extensive social welfare policies at the European level is a difficult task. Fritz Scharpf argues that European integration has taken place primarily as a negative integration that removes regulatory arrangements restricting competition and the free flow of capital (Cramme & Diamond). Measures of positive integration, including setting industry standards and providing security from harmful market contingencies, have been lacking in comparison. The emergence of a single social area entails the loss of sovereignty of individual member states in favor of more pooled sovereignty. The construction of Europe demands a gradual shift from “uncoordinated social sovereignties” to “coordinated social sovereignties that are increasingly subject to the constraints and the Eigendynamik [momentum] of supranational governance.” (McEwen & Moreno). A political mandate to pool sovereignty for social policy matters has yet to be manifested. As the integration of Europe continues forth, the continent will most likely find great difficulty in its handling of immigrants and traditional laborers as they become increasingly marginalized from the societies that the EU continues to construct without a solid framework for the political advocacy of efficient welfare systems.

Cited Works

Cramme, Olaf, and Patrick Diamond. After the Third Way: The Future of Social Democracy in Europe. London: I.B. Tauris, 2012. Print.

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton

UP, 1990. 9-33. Print.

George, Stephen, and Ian Bache. Politics in the European Union. Oxford [UK: Oxford UP, 2001. Print.

 McEwen, Nicola, and Luis Moreno. The Territorial Politics of Welfare. London: Routledge, 2005. Print.

The Dominant Social Paradigm and Environmental Attitudes.

The Dominant Social Paradigm, argued by Dunlap & Van Liere, is the notion that rigid ideals held by members of society at large are actually working to aggravate the causes of climate change. Attachments to individualism and materialism work against ecological worldviews because they promote increased consumption and non-equitable behavior. The 8 “critical factors” highlighted by Dunlap are beliefs representing major obstacles to mitigating the nation’s environmental problems. They include the championing of limited government, support for free enterprise, devotion to private property rights, emphasis upon individualism, fear of planning & support for the status quo, faith in the efficacy of science & technology, support for economic growth, and faith in future abundance. Each of these issues carries significant weight in the face of environmental development. The relationships between these views are not perfect, but they demonstrate definite constraint between those whose beliefs reflect the Dominant Social Paradigm (DSP) versus those who express concern for ecological issues, also known as the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP). The strong, conservative base of the DSP does not seem to sway much in their stances surrounding their core values, and they appear to be extremely inflexible and obtuse while supporting them in the face of dangers posed by the advance of unmitigated climate change.

Willett Kempton focuses on environmental values and how they are generated in society. He concludes that the three primary sources shaping these worldviews include religion, anthropocentric values, and biocentric values. While limited to these factors of influence, a wide range of views is still manifested. The religious viewpoints are very interesting to observe. Those who believed humans to be the work of God rather than a product of nature seemed to demonstrate a lack of regard or outright animosity toward the natural world. We should not expect that humans who believe themselves to be divine units of existence to conduct themselves with respect to nature, because why should they if are above it? Positive beliefs about the environment seemed to be standard among those whose religious feelings encompassed connectedness and oneness with the earth and world around them. (Kempton) Their beliefs come about as a result of recognizing that they have to operate within a realm of limited means with numerous other dependent variables to account for, such as the future, their health, their kids, resource availability, etc. These dichotomies in religious context were reflected in non-religious semantics through the biocentric and anthropocentric world views; biocentric reflecting the viewpoint that all life is inherently valuable, and anthropocentric indicating that the only consequential entities in the world are humans. The anthropocentric viewpoint alleges that everything in the natural world is available for our use and we can use the resources as we want. An adequate viewpoint of biocentrism is demonstrated by the quote “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, community, and beauty of the natural environment. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.” (Kempton) Utilitarian arguments emerge from each side, with proponents of the anthropogenic viewpoint indicating that the fruits of the earth are entirely ours to consume and should be used effectively to our advantage. This is dismissed by the biocentric argument which alleges that our species holds no particular importance with regards to nature, and by damaging or exploiting nature, we can only be damaging ourselves. We need to work with nature and use the totality of it to our advantage in order to maintain and cultivate life.

Schafer focuses once again on the factor of the dominant social paradigm. He alleges that the idea of a DSP in creating and maintaining major social institutions is a type of hegemony which poses a direct threat to the health of the biosphere. Researcher Gramsci is cited in the Schafer reading, theorizing that “ruling elites of a society are often able to secure the voluntary compliance of the masses through the popularization and acceptance of a worldview that is consistent with their desired agenda. This dominant worldview or paradigm is diffused through the institutions of civil society, such as the media.” This is highlighted by discussion pertaining to the role of the DSP in garnering support for the interests of economic elites in society. The DSP maintains its strength due to strong belief in core values leading to a rigid rationale for the support of the status quo. This paradigm is not likely to shift until it is shown that it is no longer advantageous. When this might be demonstrated or what it will take to do so is an entirely different issue. With the heavy influence of industries which profit from ecological destruction in media and communications, it is not difficult to observe the heavy presence of anti-environmental/pro-laissez faire sentiment in entertainment and social spheres (Schafer). Dispensa and Brulle suggest that the power of the fossil fuel industry in the US has allowed for them to severely distort messages concerning the existence of global warming, as well as the causes and effects. It is further stated that citizens of the United States, while generally one of the more educated populaces in the world, are one of the most misinformed countries when it comes to recognizing the anthropogenic causes of global warming. “Such findings suggest that US Citizens, among the most educated in the world, have been exposed to systematically distorted communications designed to marginalize the severity of the threat posed by global warming and thereby minimize the threat that this issue poses to elite economic interest.” (Schafer) Hannigan states that there is a long and well-documented history of business elites working to take advantage of scientific uncertainty to contest claims from environmentalists and defend their own position. The DSP is fortified, even at the individual level, where Cotgrove demonstrates that socioeconomic beliefs and values are much better predictors for environmental support than demographic variables.

   I find support for the DSP to be extremely short-sighted when it comes to thinking about prospects for the future and stubborn in its established attitudes about the status of equity in the world today. It seems like the dichotomy that exists between the two is more about attitudes of individualism vs. collectivism, wherein those who felt themselves to be here for only themselves demonstrated less concern for the environment around them. The strength of the paradigm is not surprising when looking at its extensive base of supporters, the immense amount of capital that goes into maintaining its stature as the right way to view things, and the propensity for those who believe themselves to be correct to avoid cross-examination of their beliefs.  Contrary to the development of a sustainable planet, support for the dominant social paradigm sentiment wholly rejects any notion of alleviating issues leading to environmental degradation, because the status quo it underpins operates under a premise that return on investment is the highest end. Allowing this to occur under the guise of a “free market” enables the turning of blind eyes to the problems created.

Cited Works

Kempton, W., J. S. Boster, and J. A. Hartley. 1996. Chapter 5, “Environmental Values.” Pp. 87-115 in Environmental Values in American Culture. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Dunlap, R. E., and K. D. Van Liere. 1984. "Commitment to the Dominant Social Paradigm and Concern for Environmental Quality." Social Science Quarterly 65: 1013-1028.

Shafer, William E. 2006. “Social Paradigms and Attitudes toward Environmental Accountability.” Journal of Business Ethics 65:121-147.

An Emotional State

For thousands of years, politics have predominantly presided over societies across the globe. They have functioned in many capacities, ranging from constructive, inventive, and fruitful, to malevolent and cataclysmic. The common trait that these societies exhibit is that they had to form, evolve, and fall apart at some point in their respective existences. A consistent driving factor in these life cycles of different societies exists in the prevalence of fear among its constituents. Human sentiment plays an immense role in the development of society, and multiple classic political theorists acknowledge this in different capacities, with fear, in earlier times, being regarded as the most detrimental of the sensibilities. No matter where on the spectrum of human emotion these feelings may lie, they have a definite impact on the founding and sustaining of states. Furthermore, that impact lies within the sovereign body that so chooses to react to these emotions through their governing patterns. Strong emotion invokes the greatest capacity of power, and this unstable entity is not ideally a property that one would wish to have influence in the scheme of politics.

The state of emotion affecting our lives is generally ignored by conventional thought, even though it plays such a colossal role in day to day life. The potential power it holds can be used as a tool for mass influence. Early realist thinker Thomas Hobbes recognized this and argued that fear and love create a type of complex relationship between the ruler and the sovereign (Hobbes, 95). These properties are crucial because they implement a feeling from the subject(s) that create a need for aid and support from the empowered. According to Hobbes, this dependence leads to an agreement, which he referred to as a covenant, between man and government that requires them to forfeit some rights in exchange for a guarantee of safety. Fear generates a need for protection and proves to be the more deciding factor in this consensus, and fellow philosopher Machiavelli would agree with Hobbes in this aspect.

Machiavelli also entertains the idea of fear playing a more critical role in the preservation of society. In The Prince, he argues that fear proves to be non-perishable once the feeling is created (Machiavelli, 68). It is much more consistent than love, which varies with the times. The subjects may see you as a martyr for a time and as a thief another. He states that these disposable feelings prove to be problematic because they are so unreliable in how strongly they influence the populace. How the people feel about the ruler is not nearly as important as how much authority the ruler exercises over them due to their apprehensiveness towards the sovereign. Fear is a much more controlling factor because it creates a sense of subservience and compliance (Hobbes, 94). While each of these theorists find these characteristics to be compulsory and significant, their stances ring cynical with later theorist, Rousseau, who argued that it was more government’s duty to carry out the wishes of the populace rather than act as an unwelcome blanket of protection (Rousseau, 24-25). He felt that the primary purpose of government was to create a harmonious faction of citizens, be responsive to their needs, and carry out the will of the common good. I find that this argument against the institution of fear in controlling society seems more valid and modern than the points that Hobbes and Machiavelli present. If government were truly carrying out the general will of the populace, there would be no need for fear, as the people would then be in control of sovereign operations rather than vice versa (Rousseau, 35). This renders the influence of emotion within the relationship of ruler and ruled irrelevant. If the populace does not feel adequately ruled, they can demand new leadership and expel the entity that they believed to have a negative effect on the society, without having to worry about the power of influence being involved. Neither fear nor love toward our sovereign leaders serve any actual purpose because they are now left disposable and easily substituted. The role of emotion goes nonexistent as general government control is allotted to the people.

Letting a balance of fear between authority figures and commoners dictate the effectiveness of the sovereign is leaving too much to the sovereign to control. They would possess too much influence, and power struggles would most likely be frequent and barbaric. One common arena we see this in today is in the middle east, in the lands of Israel/Palestine. For over one hundred years, this region has been disputed over by Jewish Zionists & Arabs, religious and non-religious, with many interstate wars and short-lived intense clashes along the way (Lieberman, 7). Often times, these disputes have come about at times when the status quo was in question due to the lack of an influential figure in control. Without a solid leader, or even a sovereign body to dictate borders, this region has witnessed dynamic skirmishes ranging from all out war to plain bitterness in daily life among the citizens of the dissected lands. This type of community cannot flourish so long as the influence of fear continues to determine the sovereign body in charge. An official governing body has not been able to establish these due to the constant shifts in power, and until the hollow leadership dissipates, it will remain this way. The puppet-like leadership that has been present in the middle-east has been empowered and weakened time and again, and this skittish administration has failed to create a solid foothold in Israeli-Palestinian society due to their lack of fortified influence (Lieberman, 9). When apprehension of your neighbors and constituents is the primary medium through which your government functions, it is sure that government productivity will be hindered and effectiveness of leadership will undoubtedly be undermined.

In our modern world, there is no room for feelings to dictate how communities conduct themselves. We must be more worried about the interest of the populace rather than the influence of the sovereign. Having a powerful, fearful leader does not promote the advancement of the state any further, nor does it help the populace in any particular way. Instilling an element of fear within the people of a nation is not necessary for a functioning government in modern society; we have our own wishes and desires for what we want government to be. We are capable of controlling our own society through democracy, and allowing this unstable element of fear to have any clout creates instability. We have advanced past the days of fearing our leaders, and now the only leading figures we should need to fear are ourselves.

Cited Works
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Broadview Pr, 2011. 94-95.
Lieberman, Victor. The Hundred-Year Struggle for Israel and Palestine. USA: Cognella, 2012.7-10.
Machiavelli, Niccoló. The Prince. Grant Richards, 1903. 68-70.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacque. The Social Contract. Cosimo, 2008. 24-35.

Koans and No-Thought

Two of the the most interesting facets of Zen buddhism are “Koans” and the concept of “no thought”. “Sakyamuni Holds Up a Flower” is a passage entailing the development of Koans in zen practice, in which a perplexing story, statement, or action provokes a knee-jerk response from one’s mind. Koans are designed to be paradoxical and confusing, and only when one exhausts thought or doesn’t delve deep into what they mean can they understand what is said. Sakyamuni held up the flower and displayed it as being the truth. By abstaining from attaching words or concepts to the truth, and presenting it as this simple manifestation of complex life, Sakyamuni relayed the message without relaying anything at all. The transmission of zen’s teachings from teacher to disciple is assessed by mutual recognition of awareness, whereby the teacher sees that the student is fully engaged in understanding, and that the student sees that the teacher can present nothing more. Koans serve as a quick jolt to the mind which may elicit a degree of enlightenment or understanding depending on how one grasps (or doesn’t grasp) the concept. 

The concept of “No Thought” is ironically very intriguing to think about. It is amusing to me to think about not thinking because it just sounds so convoluted. Ideas surrounding “No Thought” put forth the proposition that total and pure awareness is not possible while one attaches ideas, cognitions, and conventions to their surroundings. While surveying surroundings and seeing the environment, one must refrain from utilizing the mind to process what it is they are taking in and just take it in as it is, without any abstractions or distinctions. Freezing thought to work in a way which allows no discriminating ideas empowers one to view the purity of all which surrounds them.

Buddhism: The Middle Way

The middle way is an approach to thought and life which is a balance between rejecting and accepting the dogmatisms of materialism and spirituality. I see it as taking on the ideas of existence and nonexistence and placing them not at odds with each other, but recognizing the relationship between the two, and how they are in fact two sides of the same coin. Finding oneself enveloped favoring one side over the other will put one in a state of confusion because one may become too involved in that realm, and disregard the implications of ignoring the other. The middle way was discovered by the Buddha when he realized that neither asceticism nor self-indulgence could lead one to enlightenment. The connection between each method became apparent, and the illusion that ideas or happenings could be separate from others was also elucidated. The middle way is a frame of thought which is open to any and all ideas, forming sound conclusions based on comprehensive analysis of (or lack thereof) the whole, rejecting only ideas which are processed without regard for the context that goes with it.

“When you enter a village, think of it as an empty village. The forms you see there should appear as they would to a blind man, the sounds you hear should be mere echoes. The aromas you inhale should be so much thin air, the flavors you taste should be undifferentiated. Accept all sensations in accordance with the enlightenment of wisdom, and understand that all phenomena are no more than phantom forms. They have no intrinsic nature, nor do they take on any other nature.”

I think this particular passage from Vimalakirti does well to illustrate the attitude one should have when surveying their surroundings. No real effort should be made to perceive one's surroundings, because they are as they are without any evaluation. Attempting to separate these “phantom forms” is an exercise in futility, and inhibits one from viewing the whole of the situation that they may find themselves in. Seeing the nothingness in its entirety is the purest view one can take, and in taking in the whole as nothing, one can see all that is. The middle way is not a third concept between the two extremes because they are only reference points without any actual continuum existing between them. A genuine middle cannot occur between dualities, and because of this, the concept seems elusive or illusory in the way that enlightenment seems to be. One must first generate their own concept of what the middle way means in order to gravitate toward genuine understanding.

Words as Vessels

Ideas purporting the totality of everything existing as one singular function are made very clear by Tzu-Chi in his passage “Discussion on Making All Things Equal”. He began simply by discussing the implications of cramped understanding, highlighting ways in which an objectifying perspective may leave one’s mind disconcerted. Seeing people, places, events, or things as disparate or disconnected scorns the true nature of those phenomena, because if they came to fruition, there is surely a variety of reasons which led to that occurrence. Tzu-Chi utilizes his body as an example, stating that no organ is more his body than any other, and that these organs exist and function outside of his control, perhaps dictated by a god, but no matter, because they continue to operate regardless. The dividedness which we see in objects can only be discerned when viewed in relation to other, and since object and other are innately related when making assessments, separation between the objects in existence cannot really exist. Tzu-Chi then discusses the convention of words, and how they work to convey messages which are really nothing at all. Words are created and conceptualized in the mind, and have no tangible nature. They rely upon nothing to exist, have no baseline for what they could mean, yet they have something which they say. This alludes to ideas supporting the recognition of “the Middle Way.” The idea of words as a convention, which may carry as much meaning as meaning can have, all whilst remaining as hollow as empty space, represents a duality. If we recognize this thorough emptiness of meaning, we can utilize words to our wholesome advantage as we lend them their significance, and further reject their usage as we see unfit.

The Case for Higher Marginal Tax Rates

The reformation of high marginal tax rates for the top earnings brackets could be a vital course of action to combat growing income inequality in America. Low effective rates for the rich are not the exclusive reason for the growing divide between poor, middle-income, and wealthy people, but this phenomenon contributes to the widening income disparity in many destructive ways. Hacker and Pierson note that “progressivity used to be very pronounced at the very top of the tax code; now it is almost entirely absent.” We can observe from Gini coefficient inquiries that inequality measures excluding the top 1% of income earners demonstrate less inequality than those which include the top 1%. A much higher degree of divergence is noted as one approaches the upper echelons of earnings brackets. As inflation and the cost of living rise, the real value of the dollar decreases, and as earnings of those in middle and lower income brackets stagnate, their ability to exercise free will in a market economy becomes increasingly limited. With income gains becoming more and more concentrated in the hands of fewer people, and quality of life deteriorating for those who cannot keep up with the economy’s rate of expansion, there is a compelling case for the extension and expansion of tax rates to mitigate the prevalence of inequality.

When glancing over the familiar and commonly observed IRS income tax rate schedule, which compels those who earn more income to pay more, one could take for granted that US tax policy behaves in a progressive manner. However, upon closer inspection of the more tangled structure of our tax base, it is easily observed that our system is only merely progressive (Campbell, 104). In the mid-20th century, the top marginal tax rate was usually above 90%, and today it is 35%. In the 1970’s, the top capital gains tax rate was at 35%, and today it is 15%. The average rate at which the top .01% of taxpayers were taxed has decreased from over 40% to around 25%. Not only do these trends in tax cuts fail to correlate with any growth in the economy, but they also appear to be related to increasing concentration of incomes in higher earnings brackets (Hungerford, Taxes and the Economy, 16). In comparison to other OECD countries, the US not only taxes their wealthy at modest rates, but they also do very little to redistribute the income that they receive from taxation. Andrea Campbell argues that due to dissimilarity in terms of how fiscal policy and government spending are considered, the United States experiences greater inequality than other advanced nations. The amount of tax revenue that they receive as a percentage of the GDP is much lower than other countries in the industrialized world. 24% of America’s GDP comes from taxation, compared with France, Finland, Sweden, and Italy, whose tax bases makes up for close to half of their countries respective GDPs (Campbell, 101). This is not due to a smaller or less affluent tax base, or a higher incidence of tax delinquency, but because America fails to impose competitive taxes on the greatest agglomerations of wealth. Whereas the countries mentioned above continue to levy substantial taxes on substantial sums of wealth, America has strayed from this course, and has done increasingly so since after World War II (Hungerford, 2). This leaves the U.S. without what could be a significant source of revenue that would be more than useful for our domestic budget. Perhaps if the GDP and federal budget were to see a sizeable increase, it would be reasonable motivation for congress to cease contemplation of spending cuts and more avidly support legislation for general social welfare expenditures, like health insurance, public transit, job training, and education.

With this mass quantity of funds gone uncollected, there is ultimately a smaller pool of money with which to spend on social programs and other ventures to improve quality of life for general citizens. Campbell notes that our tax and transfer system with little emphasis on redistribution does little to alleviate market-generated inequalities in the way that some European economies do. The services afforded by social market economies grant a much greater degree of protections than liberal market economies from forces that are pervasive in any market. People living in SME countries typically have greater unemployment protections, greater spending on education, effectively lower costs of living, and less strife between each socioeconomic stratum (Pontusson, 58, 65). Expenditures like these are not inconsequential, especially so for those who do not possess the means to control their own economic fates. While social services may be unpopular among the rich due to their lack of need for them, they provide a great deal of support to everyone else. In addition, some government services benefit those who are more well off more so than anyone else, and in some cases only benefit them (e.g. through police protections, defense of contracts, subsidized public infrastructure) because they have much more expendable capital, more property to defend, and concurrently and most importantly, more assets to lose.  Why should it be the case that commonplace citizens foot the bill for a system of social services which hardly reconcile with the needs of the populace, rather than those who reap distinctly greater rewards out of it?

Expanding taxes on the rich would generate a great deal of revenue that could be utilized to educate, support, and supplement the masses. It does not call for outright piggybacking of the rich; it merely calls for an imposition on the mass amounts of capital which proportionally dwarf the incomes of those not in the higher earnings distribution in order to create a more impartial and unobstructed socioeconomic system. As wealth is allowed to beget itself, so is poverty and inequality. By shifting resources from sitting in hoards to supporting action, the potential of this wealth is finally realized. Money represents enduring wealth, which is functional only so long as it is utilized. In observing how vast sums of capital are made use of in this heavily financialized economy (entailing the self-generation of more capital), it is no surprise that money has been unsuccessful at functioning as a mechanism for which the common person could build and sustain wealth (Hacker & Pierson, 55). As gains become more concentrated and the share of the economic pie drifts continuously into the hands of the super affluent, the scarcity of money begins to increase in significance. While a majority of Americans continue to back various social causes like financial aid for college, improved public education, and support structures for the poor, there is not as much flexibility in the budget to support these endeavors (Campbell, 110). Disbanding and dispersing private sheltered reserves of capital into societal expenditures would not only sharply decrease the magnitude of economic inequality, but it would provide for a much more sizable budget that could be geared toward aiding the well-being and mobility of the ailing, at-large population.

The odds that we could see something like an increase in the top marginal rates is highly unlikely at this point in time. For years, we have observed a trend of diminishing rates at the higher income levels for reasons that are seemingly aimless. We can see the negative effects of what reductions in the top marginal rate does to GDP, amount of tax revenue, budget, and amount of inequality, yet the course continues. Public opinion at large has also never been in opposition to taxes on those who earn more money, especially so when that income is earned from dividends and capital gains. Our current taxation system is very complicated and convoluted, and it creates confusion and mistrust because of its high degree of obscurity. In one study, Americans were asked what bothers them most about taxes, and in what seems like a farce, it was reported that they were more than twice as likely to note the complexity of the system as their primary reservation than they were to refer to the amount they pay (Campbell, 110). Should simpler codes be put into place, there would likely be less skepticism among people who cannot easily grasp the intricacies of taxation systems. If there is anyone in favor of tax reform, it is most likely the average citizen.

It is due to a number of connected and disconnected factors that effective tax rates have been allowed to slip down to the levels that they are today. The importance of lobbying in government has led affluent individuals to, either collectively or independently, overinflate the voice and perceived prominence of minority groups that are often highly ideological and very extreme (Hacker & Pierson). The cost of this newly-afforded attention from policy makers comes at the expense of the working-class citizen, whose role in government cannot exceed that of their ballot casting due to time constraints, lack of sophistication & interest, and needless to say, their inability to contribute funds to campaigns. As income gains become more concentrated, the likelihood that any one person can contribute to an election campaign and have their views expressed through policy enactments becomes more and more slim. The “Winner-Take-All” model described by Hacker and Pierson leads to a lapse in democratic practice and distorts the political landscape by having interests relayed as a function of monetary donations. The formation of the first Political Action Committee in the 1970s marked the first time that members of Congress could look to alternative places for campaign funding, which had a powerful impact on the governing body’s ideological balance (Hacker & Pierson, 178). Business interests massively increased their contributions to campaigns right around the time that campaigns were becoming more expensive, and politicians had good reason to heed the interests that had the greatest quantities to contribute (177). The financing of the GOP by corporate and business PACs was viewed as an investment that would ensure commitment to an agenda of advocacy for the free market, advancing deregulation and tax cuts. The “Contract with America” movement spearheaded by Newt Gingrich in the 1990s reflected a sensationalizing approach to why we needed lower taxes (Gravelle, 3). Not only were GOP seats debased in return for investment, but democrats were also. They had to respond to this new political machine and had to do so in a receptive manner, or else they would be snubbed. Money was channeled to Democratic candidates in order to discourage the passage of undesirable bills, creating loopholes in attempts to enact new legislation. This outcome is termed “Policy drift,” which is the “politically driven failure of public policies to adapt to the shifting realities of a dynamic economy and society.” (Hacker & Pierson, 170) This drift makes policy enactments difficult, while at the same time giving policy based on the exploitation of drift a much easier course to navigate. Political gridlock favors the status quo, which has more support among Republican congressmen, accordingly leading them to support gridlock. Increased polarization leads to less action, which leads to less adaptation, which begets the continuation of the status quo. While policies allowing for top tax rates to dwindle have enjoyed the support of congress, policies calling for increased taxes on the wealthy have gone ignored, and there has been almost no serious attention paid to initiatives to boost the stock of middle and lower income groups. It is plausible that due to a lack of incentive or a fear of political backlash that congressmen have remained idle while gains made in upper earnings brackets detract from the rest of the economy.

An increase in the top marginal tax rates would have to occur as a result of widespread salience of the issue in which the population sees that it has a negative impact on their well being. Many people may have problems with being able to view this issue and see that this phenomenon of protecting vast wealth occurs as a result of processes that are purely political. As Bartels noted throughout Unequal Democracy, voters are largely unsophisticated, and they should not be expected to hold views that seem as though they are fully-informed or rational (65). Legislation for greater taxation of the wealthy will likely not be written by any congressman whose campaigns are funded by wealthy people who would suffer as a result. The difficulties with our current tax system transpired deliberately through specific actions and non-actions on the part of legislators. In order to sidestep this collective problem with the status quo, it need first be recognized that change is both possible, and perhaps more importantly, necessary. If the average citizen cannot recognize that high top marginal tax rates are something which would be in the best interest of the country, it is more than doubtful that legislators with an eye on their bankroll for the next election campaign would be any more eager to increase taxes on the people who finance the continuation of their employment.

Increasing the top marginal tax rates is an effective measure to alleviate pressures on those who are not fortunate enough to garner sizable values of income. John Rawls stated “a particular allocation yields an optimum if there is no redistribution which would improve one individual’s position without worsening that of another.” I see no fundamental problem with the greatest gains of some being allocated to offset the lesser losses of others. In order to combat the ills that arise with inequality, it is best to prevent it before it can become too pervasive. In a country where 60% of the top .01% of taxpayers have leverage over their compensation, and increased financialization of the economy has created a game of fabricating prosperity, it is impossible to join in creating wealth without first starting off in faultless circumstances (Campbell, 111). This leaves most all people out in the cold to fend for financial footing in the sphere of commerce where activity remains constant. The potential of a person is cut drastically when they do not have access to opportunities to exercise their abilities. To create more favorable and equitable outcomes in a society, a principle of fairness must be applied at the origination. Rawls “Justice as Fairness” maxim showcases a view which purports that every person has an equal claim to equal basic rights and liberties. His “Veil of Ignorance” thought experiment questions the idea that we would ever want a society that could be unfair. If a person did not know their place in society, he argues that people would generally tend toward supporting principles that are fair to everybody (80). I agree with this notion that anybody who did not know their position in society would support equal standing as a starting point.  Robert Nozick argues against this claim and establishes it as an “entitlement theory.” (96) The idea behind Rawls view is that one is subject to forces beyond their control in any given point in their life. In order to combat any issues that could arise as a result of being subject to environmental factors, one can attempt to dissolve those detrimental factors. If those were lifted equally, then everyone is subject to the same remaining forces. Nozick is incorrect because he fails to recognize that total control of one’s life is not in the hands of any individual. The forces around them have much more to do with their fate than anything, and at life’s inception, there is no autonomy whatsoever. In order to grant the greatest degree of liberty and freedom to the greatest number of people, a starting point with more alike, or at least more adequate resources should be standardized and protected. In order to combat the growth of inequality, we should see to it that the substantial gains of some are not accruing at the costs of others, and recognize that the socialized costs of not redistributing inactive swaths of capital are greater than the would-be losses by a large margin.

Citations

Bartels, Larry M. Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008. Print.

Campbell, Andrea Louise. "America the Undertaxed." Foreign Affairs. 1 Sept 2012. Web.

Gravelle, Jane. “Capital Gains Taxes: An Overview.” Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, n.d. 24 Jan 2007. Web.

Hacker, J. S., and P. Pierson. "Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States." Politics & Society 38.2 (2010): 152-204. Sage Publishing. Web.

Hungerford, Thomas L. “Changes in Income Inequality Among U.S. Tax Filers between 1991 and 2006: The Role of Wages, Capital Income, and Taxes.” 23 Jan 2013. Web.

Hungerford, Thomas L. “Taxes and the Economy: An Economic Analysis of the Top Tax Rates since 1945.” Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2012. Web.

Nozick, Robert. "Distributive Justice." Readings in Social and Political Philosophy. New York: Oxford UP, 1986. 96-116. Print.

Pontusson, Jonas. “Inequality and Prosperity: Social Europe vs. Liberal America.” Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP. 2005. 1-94. Print.

Rawls, John. "Distributive Justice." Readings in Social and Political Philosophy. New York: Oxford UP, 1986. 73-94. Print.