The term welfare state has become
increasingly controversial among populations who like to fabricate it with
their own definition. It predominantly describes institutions associated with
the production and distribution of social well-being. The definition of “social
well-being” clearly varies according to each country’s standards, and it is
evident when looking at contrasting models of individual welfare states. These
systems can differ greatly in scope and size, with some models contributing to
growth at the lowest common denominations, and others subsidizing and
socializing costs at the highest marginal rates. Some assume responsibility
only when the individual family or aspects of the market fail, while some
comprehensively address the needs of the entire population in a perpetual
manner (Esping & Anderson, 1991). Rather than existing as a mechanism that
intervenes in or corrects structures of inequality, the type of social policy
enacted creates a system of stratification which is in itself an active force
in the ordering of social relations. As globalization and markets become
increasingly hegemonic, universalistic forces, the welfare of the individual
comes to depend on monetary exchange, eventually culminating in value reduction
of a person below a certain threshold of dollars.
Concepts of social democracy have existed
in Europe for generations. The ideas supported by these schools of thought
dealt with the issue of overcoming constraining boundaries placed on citizens
by market forces. The stripping of layers which serve to protect people and
guarantee social reproduction commodifies their existence as their livelihood
comes to rely on labor competition (Esping & Anderson). The introduction of
social rights reduces this commodity status, as reliance on the market is
reduced and greater autonomy results. Residual welfare states seek to limit
benefits to marginal groups deemed to be deserving of resources. Institutional
welfare states tend to the needs of entire populations, and principally, what
makes this system different is that it sees conscience, and not class, as key
to political power (Cramme & Diamond, 2012). They extend commitment to all
areas of distribution for the greater well being of society. With an enduring
framework of ethical values combined with a strong commitment to evolving
normative ideals, the eradication of human misery and suffering is the main
priority. Since the end of World War II,
there has been striking variation in policy pursued by center left parties, and
each has sought to evolve their own particular model of welfare, with varying
degrees of success from each (Esping & Anderson). Many western European
countries were dominated by the Christian Democratic Right, promising a new
model of social market capitalism, but it was only in Scandinavia where the
center-left sustained electoral hegemony and the institutional model of
welfare. With regard to collective provisions, it is claimed that member states
of the EU have lost control over national welfare policies, and social policy
is becoming ever more situated in a complex, multi-layered web of political
decision making (McEwen & Moreno, 2005). One mechanism which may serve as a
good example of this reduced autonomy is illustrated by European Commission
activity surrounding external trade policy.
The EC trade negotiations are conducted
between EU member states, the commission, and trade partners. Individual states
form their own negotiating positions which serve to reflect their own domestic
interests. These positions are then deliberated further by the states
collectively in order to determine an official mandate for the Commission to
work for in wider trade talks. The commission then negotiates in the wider
talks within the constrained frame constructed by the interests of the individual
states. In the class text, contributor Meunier (2007) noted that neither the
adoption of the approach of “managed globalization” or “Global Europe” involved
a new mandate from member states. The writer then noted that there was little
evidence to uphold the argument that the commission had significant autonomy in
creating policy. I disagree on the grounds that concessions had to be met from
each country regardless. There was definite presence of constraining attitudes
surrounding the trade talks, otherwise every state could have adequately
represented themselves rather than delegate a body to form a collective,
majoritarian interest to eliminate marginalized concerns in the process. While
productive in terms of completing the objective of formalizing an agreement,
the move to allow the EC to negotiate deals for the states effectively stripped
them of some power, ultimately undermining consociationalism.
It
is hardly surprising that various models of social democracy have not proven to
be as successful as others. At the core of the issue is whether shifts in
policy inevitably entail the dilution of core values of the country. Because
globalization and the free flow of capital limits the potential for traditional
social democratic intervention in a unitary economy, the value of those
phenomena must be evaluated. The downgrading of government activism in the face
of global market competition has left those in the middle and lower income
brackets relatively unprotected. Structural unemployment and worklessness have
increased while wealth and income inequality has soared, with those at the very
top reaping increasingly greater benefits (Cramme & Diamond). Social
democracy has become more and more defensive in facing these challenges, which
fuel cynicism and disengagement from politics itself. Recognizing the limits of
the European Union as a form of economic and political coordination is
imperative for social democrats. The drive toward further economic integration
since the 1950s has hardly protected member states from the impacts of
globalization and the restructuring of industry (Cramme & Diamond). The
realities of national politics appear to be far removed from EU activity as the
gap between institutions and citizens continues to flourish without the advent
of a strong political anchor. In the aftermath of the recent financial meltdown
and Greek sovereign debt crisis, the EU appears to offer little reassurance to
economic despair.
It has been of great controversy that a
divide of interests has set apart the beneficiaries of the developing
globalized economic sectors against low-skilled workers whose wages have
continued to decline. This social divide is markedly important due to the
political implications it presents, effectively marginalizing groups due to their
falling wages and stagnant social mobility. In addition to this, Europe also
faces issues dealing with the reception of immigrants, who have been marked as
“others” in some realms of society (McEwen & Moreno). The response by
social democrats to the problems of integration and social malaise have clearly
been shown to be insufficient, and as a result, some of its past historic
achievements are under threat from opposing factions. The European Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy
is measured in terms of social, economic, and political participation. The
aspect of participation is in itself likely the most important, whereby one
obtains an adequate level of education and employability to flourish in society
(Cramme & Diamond). A group of people cannot be considered successfully
integrated when their school performance, labor market participation, average
life expectancy, and imprisonment rate disproportionately deviate from the
averages of the population. In most European societies, immigrant groups and
their second and third generation descendents are often entrenched by these
problems. As complex as the process of integration proves to be, incorporating
newcomers into society can be achieved, and the institutions of education and
labor seem to be the most effective means of doing so (Cramme & Diamond).
Lamentably, states do not always put forth effort to extend these benefits to
migrants. Inclusiveness proves to be the difference maker in whether or not a
person may have the opportunity to delve into a new society. Barriers to
entering the labor market and unequal access to education limit the ability of
some folks to adequately handle the immersion experience, and new forms of
vulnerability and resentment emerge as political parties exploit the feelings
of vulnerability and xenophobia demonstrated by populations who feel threatened
by the presence of new ethnic groups (McEwen & Moreno). This is especially
prevalent in countries with proportional representation and fragmented political
landscapes. A dangerous vacuum has emerged whereby “cultural” explanations are
employed to stoke up social tensions between the immigrant population and the
native population (Cramme & Diamond).
Failed integration serves to create an
association between being non-native, being poor, and being welfare dependent.
This tempts members of the native population “in-groups” to define failed
integration, deprivation, and inequality not as socioeconomic issues, but as
issues brought about by the migrant cultures themselves. These “cultural
explanations” serve only as fuel for mutual estrangement, heightening
socioeconomic marginalization, and poor integration of immigrant communities
(McEwen & Moreno). The Netherlands, for example, plays host to many
Moroccans and Turks who do not really identify with their new country, but
rather consider themselves foreigners in their new land, which could lead to an
array of pathologies resulting from a lack of a sense of community. Continuing
developments have led to a broadening of the meaning of integration to include
the extent to which non-natives share values as well as the lifestyle of their
new countries. Integration done the right way will leave out the confusion
purported by right wing populism, which seeks to continually objectify
immigrants as dumb, dangerous, welfare dependent foreigners who may be a threat
to society.
Challenges such as these call into
question one of the central functions that have evolved within the
responsibility of the state - the protection of citizens welfare. In surveying
history, it would not be inaccurate to claim that it has been the
responsibility of the state to grant social rights and provide social support
for its members. This is in conflict with ideas professing that the use of
societal resources is grounded in national identity. The emotional force of
nationhood and feelings of acceptance it brings about contributes to the
collectivity of social risk and the democratization of weighty negative
outcomes. States that could impose obligations to solidarity and create a union
of the strong and weak actors were able to form collective schemes of provision
to develop healthy societies. These types of welfare transactions serve as
expressions of the concept of society backed by a sense of community and
strengthened by the legitimacy of the state and its institutions. This
portrayal of the state as the protector and possessor of solidarity has led
many to the conclusion that only states can develop comprehensive welfare
programs (McEwen & Moreno). The capacity for substantial supranational
political intervention in Europe is negligible, and even further restricted by
a lack of motivational resources that could give legitimacy to interventionist
strategies. Based on these notions, it has been suggested that establishing
extensive social welfare policies at the European level is a difficult task.
Fritz Scharpf argues that European integration has taken place primarily as a
negative integration that removes regulatory arrangements restricting competition
and the free flow of capital (Cramme & Diamond). Measures of positive
integration, including setting industry standards and providing security from
harmful market contingencies, have been lacking in comparison. The emergence of
a single social area entails the loss of sovereignty of individual member
states in favor of more pooled sovereignty. The construction of Europe demands
a gradual shift from “uncoordinated social sovereignties” to “coordinated
social sovereignties that are increasingly subject to the constraints and the Eigendynamik [momentum] of supranational
governance.” (McEwen & Moreno). A political mandate to pool sovereignty for
social policy matters has yet to be manifested. As the integration of Europe
continues forth, the continent will most likely find great difficulty in its
handling of immigrants and traditional laborers as they become increasingly
marginalized from the societies that the EU continues to construct without a
solid framework for the political advocacy of efficient welfare systems.
Cited Works
Cramme, Olaf, and Patrick Diamond. After the Third Way: The Future of Social
Democracy in Europe. London: I.B. Tauris, 2012. Print.
Esping-Andersen,
Gøsta. The Three Worlds of Welfare
Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
UP,
1990. 9-33. Print.
George, Stephen, and Ian Bache. Politics in the European Union. Oxford
[UK: Oxford UP, 2001. Print.
McEwen, Nicola, and Luis Moreno. The Territorial Politics of Welfare.
London: Routledge, 2005. Print.
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